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THE WIDTH OF A PROOF 
Gila Hanna  
This paper’s aim is to discuss the concept of width of a proof put forward by 
Timothy Gowers. It explains what this concept means and attempts to show 
how it relates to other concepts discussed in the existing literature on proof 
and proving. It also explores how the concept of width of a proof might be 
used productively in the mathematics curriculum and how it might fit with the 
various perspectives on learning to prove.   
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La amplitud de una demostración 
El objetivo de este artículo es discutir el concepto de amplitud de una demos-
tración  presentado  por  Timothy  Gowers.  Se  explica  el  significado  de  este 
concepto y se trata de mostrar cómo se relaciona con otros conceptos discu-
tidos en la literatura existente sobre prueba y demostraciones. También se 
explora cómo el concepto de amplitud de una demostración podría utilizarse 
productivamente en el currículo de matemáticas y cómo podría encajar con 
las diferentes perspectivas sobre el aprendizaje de la demostración. 
Términos clave: Argumentación; Demostración; Explicación; Memorable  
This paper partly addresses the themes “The importance of explanation, justification, 
argumentation and proof and their relationships in mathematics and in mathematics 
education” and “The use, evolution, elaboration or integration of theoretical frames 
relevant for research argumentation and proof in an educational perspective” debated 
at the 8th Congress of European Research in Mathematics Education (CERME). It 
aims to discuss the concept of width of a proof put forward by Timothy Gowers 
(2007). 
Both mathematicians and mathematics teachers are well aware that mathematical 
explanation and mathematical understanding are elusive terms. Indeed, these concepts 
are recurring topics in both mathematics and mathematics education. Even though the 
term understanding is not precisely defined, it is often invoked in the context of proof 
and proving. Most mathematicians and educators do share the view that a proof is 
most valuable when it leads to understanding (Balacheff, 2010; de Villiers, 2010; 
Hanna, 2000; Knipping, 2008; Manin, 1998; Mariotti, 2006; Mejia-Ramos, Fuller, G. Hanna  
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Weber, Rhoads, & Samkoff, 2012; Thurston, 1994). For this reason, mathematicians 
see proofs less as correct syntactical derivations and more as conceptual entities, con-
sisting of a logical sequence of related mathematical ideas, in which the specific tech-
nical derivation approach is secondary.  
But when the focus on proof is primarily conceptual, there arises a need for well-
defined criteria, apart from the well-known syntactical ones, by which the quality of a 
proof can be evaluated. In the absence of such well-defined criteria, value judgments 
are often made on the basis of properties with an aesthetic flavour that have no precise 
meaning, such as comprehensible, ingenious, explanatory, elegant, deep, beautiful, 
and insightful. Clearly, such properties go well beyond the logical correctness neces-
sary to prove a theorem. But in both mathematical practice and mathematics education 
these quasi-aesthetic properties of proof, ill-defined as they may be, are extremely im-
portant, because they speak to the recognition by mathematicians and educators that 
proofs are “far more than certificates of truth” (Gowers, 2007, p. 37). 
Aesthetically pleasing proofs enjoy a privileged position for that reason alone, of 
course, but Gowers notes that “…it is remarkable how important a well-developed 
aesthetic sensibility can be, for purely pragmatic reasons, in mathematical research” 
(p. 37). The pragmatic reasons include enhanced ease of communication among math-
ematicians, increased interest, and the very important feature of being memorable. 
Memorability takes us to the concept of the width of a proof.  
WHAT IS MEANT BY THE WIDTH OF A PROOF? 
In approaching this concept, it is helpful to consider first what drove the mathemati-
cian Timothy Gowers to define the quality of mathematical proof for which he coined 
the term width, and the weight he gives to the associated notion of memorability. De-
ploring the fact that there is no well-defined language for expressing value judgments 
about the desirable quasi-aesthetic properties of proof, such as the ones mentioned 
above, Gowers set out by trying to clarify what is really meant by the words already in 
use to describe the quality of a proof. His attempt to come up with “a good theory of 
informal mathematical evaluation” (Gowers, 2007, p. 39) led him to suggest paying 
more attention to memory. More specifically, he found it valuable, in formulating a 
good theory of mathematical evaluation, to consider the way mathematicians employ 
memory in creating and in understanding proofs.  
Memorability 
In the field of education the terms memory and memorizing are unfortunately associ-
ated with the undesirable notion of rote learning, which by definition eschews both 
explanation  and  understanding.  But  for  Gowers  memory  has  an  entirely  different 
meaning; in his discourse the term is very strongly associated with explanation and 
understanding, and he sees it as a crucial tool for mathematical thinking. Gowers 
notes, first of all, that a memorable proof is “greatly preferable to an unmemorable 
one” (p. 39), and adds that “memorability does seem to be intimately related to other The width of a proof   
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desirable properties of proof, such as elegance or explanatory power” (p. 40). This 
raises the interesting question of why some proofs are easier to remember than others, 
and what role is played in memorability by various other non-syntactical properties 
such as elegance and ingenuity.  
Unlike other properties so often cited, Gowers argues that the concept of memory 
is sufficiently precise to be easily investigated and eventually quantified. First, it is 
easy to determine whether one remembers how to prove a theorem or doesn’t. Second, 
it would be feasible for educators or psychologists to find out what features of proofs 
make  them  more  memorable.  Third,  memory  is  clearly  related  to  the  background 
knowledge of the learner (or the mathematician). 
Gowers may have gone too far in stating that there is a “very close connection be-
tween memorizing a proof and understanding it” (p. 40), as if that were firmly estab-
lished. He states that 
the fact that memory and understanding are closely linked provides some en-
couragement for the idea that a study of memory could lie at the heart of an 
explication of the looser kind described earlier. It is not easy to say precisely 
what it means to understand a proof (as opposed, say, to being able to follow 
it line-by-line and see that every step is valid), but easier to say what it means 
to remember one. Although understanding a proof is not the same as being 
able to remember it easily, it may be that if we have a good theory of what 
makes a proof memorable, then this will shed enough light on what it is to 
understand  it  that  the  difference  between  the  two  will  be  relatively  unim-
portant. (p. 41) 
The concept of memorability leads Gowers to suggest looking at width, a term bor-
rowed from theoretical computer science, where it refers to the amount of storage 
space needed to run an algorithm. Gowers draws a parallel between “keeping in mind” 
and “computer storage space”, in the belief that storage in computers is analogous to 
memory in humans. Thus the width of a proof would be a measure of how many dis-
tinct pieces of information or ideas one has to keep in mind (to hold in your memory) 
in order to be able to construct or follow a proof, to understand it, and to remember it.  
Width 
It is important to make the distinction between the width of a proof and its length. 
Whereas the length of a proof refers to how many lines of argument are needed to 
prove a theorem, the width refers to the number of distinct ideas one has to keep in 
mind (or memorize) in achieving that goal. As mentioned above, for Gowers the term 
memorable is intimately connected with understanding and means easy to memorize. 
Thus it becomes important to try to determine which features of a proof might con-
tribute to making it memorable, and in his opinion, 
some proofs need quite a lot of direct memorization, while others generate 
themselves… if we think about what it is that makes memorable proofs memo-
rable, then we may find precise properties that some proofs have and others G. Hanna  
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lack… if mathematicians come to understand better what makes proofs mem-
orable, then they may be more inclined to write out memorable proofs, to the 
great benefit of mathematics. (p. 43) 
Gowers suggests paying close attention to how mathematicians might memorize a 
piece of mathematics in general and a proof in particular. For this reason, he goes on 
to expand on his notion of memorability by placing it in the context of mental arith-
metic, discussing how one remembers sequences of numbers and how one might go 
about adding large numbers without writing anything down. 
It is sufficient here to mention familiar arithmetic operations in which the width of 
the calculation (that is, the number of pieces of information one must keep in one’s 
memory in order to perform a calculation) can be reduced by appropriate simplifica-
tions. For example, the mental multiplication of  52 47×  could be greatly reduced in 
width,  according  to  Gowers,  as  soon  as  it  is  perceived  as  the  difference  of  two 
squares. One could represent the product 47×52 as the product of  ) 3 50 ( −  by (50+3), 
minus 47, which yields (2500−9)−47. The reduction in width occurs because this 
way of handling the operation means that one has to keep fewer digits in mind than 
when mentally performing the multiplication 47×52 using the customary algorithm. 
One has eliminated the need to remember multiple digits, at the cost of introducing a 
single new insightful idea, the concept of the difference of two squares. In Gowers’s 
terms, this new idea has transformed the original large-width operation into a lower-
width one. 
Examples 
Gowers also illustrates his ideas by citing two examples that are more complex and go 
beyond the realm of numerical calculation: one being the proof of the existence of a 
prime factorization (a fundamental theorem of arithmetic) and the other being the 
proof that the square root of 2 is irrational. The latter is shown here.  
Proof that the Square Root of 2 is Irrational 
There are several proofs of this theorem using different methods, such as proof by 
infinite descent, by contradiction, by unique factorization, and by the use of geometry. 
The proof by contradiction is appropriate for mathematics education, and in fact has 
often been discussed by mathematics educators in the context of the overall notion of 
proof by contradiction. The following is one version of the proof by contradiction.  
Assume that  2 is a rational number. This would mean that there are positive 
integers p and q with q ≠0 such that  p
q
= 2 . We may assume that the frac-
tion  p
q
 is in its lowest terms; it can be written  2 =
2− 2
2 −1
.  
 The width of a proof   
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Then, substituting  p
q
= 2 ; 
p
q
=
(2− p
q
)
p
q−1
=
2q− p
p−q
  
Because  p
q
= 2 , it lies between 1 and 2, we haveq < p< 2q.  
It follows that: 0 < 2q− p< p and 0 < p−q < p 
We found a fraction equal to  p
q
 but with smaller numerator and denominator. 
This is a contradiction, so the assumption that  p
q
 is in lowest term ( 2  is ra-
tional) must be false.  
Gowers’s point is that this version of the proof contains a step (Step 2) that seems to 
spring  from  nowhere,  namely  the  choice  to  write  p
q
= 2  as  the  expression 
.
1 2
2 2
−
−
=
q
p  Clearly, this expression is useful, but where does it come from? Clearly, 
it would come from the memory of the trained mathematician. This is a case in which 
one has to have used one’s memory to store an idea for later application. But this 
proof  is  nevertheless  of  lower  width  than  it  would  have  been  without  this  one 
ingenious idea, because of the greater number of calculations that would have been 
needed to complete it otherwise. Of course, another low width proof is the one by 
contradiction: Assuming  p
q
= 2  is rational, then  p
2 = 2q
2 means that p is even. As-
suming p and q mutually prime, q must be odd. However, the square of an even num-
ber is divisible by 4, which implies that q is even, hence a contradiction. 
Of course, it would help the reader of the proof to clarify why someone thought of 
this idea, because a step in a proof should not appear as a deus ex machina. Leaving 
that aside, however, Gowers points out that this particular step is no more than “what 
mathematicians normally mean by an idea” (p. 48). Ideas, according to Gowers, are in 
fact an intrinsic property of proofs, side by side with the property of correct logical 
derivation.  
An Example from Geometry: Proof of Viviani’s Theorem 
Viviani’s theorem: For a point P inside an equilateral triangle ΔABC, the sum of the 
perpendiculars pa, pb,  and  pc from P to the sides of the triangle is equal to the altitude 
h.  G. Hanna  
PNA 9(1) 
34 
Proof: 
The idea is to recall that the area of a triangle is half its base times its height. 
This result is then simply proved as follows:  
ΔABC = ΔPBC+ΔPCA+ΔPAB 
With s the side length, we have:  
1
2
sh =
1
2
spa +
1
2
spb +
1
2
spc  
h = pa + pb + pc . 
This proof of Viviani’s theorem is also of low width, because it can be generated by 
using just one powerful idea (the area of a triangle).   
Back to Width 
What then is the width of a proof? Gowers’s first try at a definition is the following. 
It is tempting to define the width of a proof… as the number of steps, or step-
generating thoughts, that one has to hold in one’s head at any one time… 
suppose that I want to convince somebody else… that a proof is valid, without 
writing anything down. It is sometimes possible to do this, but by no means 
always. What makes it possible when it is? Width is certainly important here. 
For example, some mathematics problems have the interesting property of be-
ing very hard, until one is given a hint that suddenly makes them very easy. 
The solution to such a problem, when fully written out, may be quite long, but 
if all one actually needs to remember, or to communicate to another person, 
is the hint, then one can have the sensation of grasping it all at once. (p. 55) 
This restates the idea that the factor that determines the width of a proof is the number 
of distinct pieces of information, or ideas, needed to complete it. In Gowers’s view, 
the fewer such pieces, the easier it should be to follow a proof or to actively devise 
one. A proof of low width, with few pieces of information to carry in one’s head, 
would be superior to one of high width. Often it is a case of introducing a single new 
but very productive idea that makes it unnecessary to deal with a larger number of less 
interesting ones. 
That does not mean that a proof must be short, because the length of a proof is not 
identical with its width, as pointed out earlier. Whereas the length of a proof usually 
refers to the number of deductive steps required to complete it, the width of a proof 
refers to the number of distinct items, or distinct ideas, that must be kept in memory in 
order to read, learn and understand the proof.  
Reflections on Gowers’s Notion of Width 
Gowers’s notion of width does not seem to capture in a single measure the many non-
syntactical properties of proof, such as comprehensible, ingenious, explanatory, ele-The width of a proof   
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gant, deep, beautiful, and insightful. Discussion of this point is difficult because none 
of these terms are well defined, as Gowers points out. The main difficulty, however, 
seems to be that these terms are far from being synonyms or even overlapping. One 
could even argue that some of these properties of proof, if not opposites, are at least 
orthogonal to one another. Very concise proofs are often considered elegant or beauti-
ful, for example, but they are also less likely to be comprehensible or explanatory. 
Thus, even if width does prove to be a useful and potentially measurable property 
of proof, it would not appear to be one that could serve in place of the less measure-
able non-syntactical properties that mathematicians have always found meaningful 
and useful. To which of these properties width is most correlated remains an interest-
ing question. An elegant proof, for example, would presumably be considered of low 
width (and that would be seen as a positive thing). One can imagine, however, a proof 
designed expressly to be highly explanatory, in which the multiplicity of ideas brought 
to bear would make it of high width.  
The concept of width would also appear to suffer from a lack of clarity as to how 
different kinds of memorized information—digits, concepts, rules—are to be counted. 
In the above example of arithmetic multiplication, the point is made that mental use of 
the normal algorithm requires that many interim digits be kept in mind, implying that 
the procedure has a large width. The width can be reduced, as Gowers states, by using 
an ingenious procedure employing the difference of two squares. Now, it is true that 
in the ingenious procedure there are fewer digits to memorize, but on the other hand 
one has to have had in mind the notion of the difference of two squares. One could 
argue that the mental capacity to store such a relatively sophisticated mathematical 
notion is greater than that needed to store a few digits. Perhaps there is an opening to 
refine the idea of width by considering whether or not different types of information 
might be assigned different weights. 
Another consideration might be how long a piece of information has to be kept in 
mind. To take the example of the calculation just discussed, the concept of the differ-
ence of two squares must be kept in mind always, so it can be called upon whenever 
needed, in this calculation or others, while the memory devoted to interim digits can 
be released as soon as the calculation is finished. The management of computer stor-
age has a strong focus on how long a piece of storage is required. The inspiration for 
the term width came from computer storage, so it might be refined by taking into ac-
count the dimension of time. 
In considering the concept of width, one is tempted by some examples to say that 
lower width is good, while others show the value of a richness of ideas, in which case 
a greater width is better. Be that as it may, mathematics educators already know that it 
is not enough for students, when they engage in proving, to have mastered the con-
cepts and techniques required to construct valid sequences of logical steps. It is im-
portant for them to have a broad grasp of mathematics, so that they can draw upon a 
reservoir of important mathematical ideas, stored in their memory, and see how to ap-
ply them to the mathematical argument they are engaged in constructing.  G. Hanna  
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Because it is a psychological concept, it is not surprising that width is difficult to 
define. Gowers says as much when he states that a “… precise discussion of width as 
a psychological concept is quite difficult” (p. 51, italics in the source). 
An even more basic question that might be raised, however, is whether it is neces-
sary  to  have  quantifiable  measures  of  non-syntactical  properties.  Mathematicians 
know an elegant proof or an ingenious proof when they see one, just as mathematics 
educators are quite capable of deciding which proofs are going to be more useful in 
conveying to their students important mathematical ideas and their connections.  
In commenting on the concept of width, one must keep in mind that Gowers sees 
his investigation as a work in progress. While conceding that the notion of width of a 
proof is not precise and certainly still lacks a formal definition, Gowers hopes that 
more work will lead him to come up with a definition “more precise than subjective-
sounding concepts such as ‘transparent’, or even ‘easily memorable’” (p. 57). 
ASSOCIATED MATHEMATICS EDUCATION RESEARCH  
A review of the current literature on proof and proving in mathematics education 
shows that the concept of the width of a proof is not discussed (understandably so 
since it is a novel one), but several research papers have dealt, as Gowers does, with 
the non-syntactical properties of proofs and their importance. 
Mejia-Ramos et al. (2012), recognizing that different proofs of the same theorem 
improve mathematical comprehension to different degrees, sought to devise an as-
sessment model that could be used to measure the impact of the proof judged more 
promising from the point of view of comprehension.  
They first reviewed the mathematics education research on the purposes of proof; 
and then the existing recommendations for proof that encourage comprehension, at 
various educational levels. Finally, they interviewed nine university mathematics pro-
fessors to determine what types of proof comprehension were most valued in universi-
ty mathematics. Judging by their abstract, these researchers saw the importance to 
comprehension of the non-syntactical aspects of proof that impelled Gowers to look 
into the idea of the width of a proof.  
…in undergraduate mathematics a proof is not only understood in terms of 
the meaning, logical status, and logical chaining of its statements but also in 
terms of the proof’s high-level ideas, its main components or modules, the 
methods it employs, and how it relates to specific examples. We illustrate how 
each of these types of understanding can be assessed in the context of a proof 
in number theory. (Mejia-Ramos et al., 2012, p. 3) 
Hanna and Barbeau (2009) investigated the properties intrinsic to certain proofs that 
allow them to convey to students methods and strategies for problem solving. They 
also looked at the extent to which certain types of proof might yield new insights that 
are somewhat easier to keep in memory. The width of a proof   
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Closely related to the concept of width is that of a memorable idea in a proof, 
which Leron (1983) looked at from a unique perspective in his work on structured 
proofs. Structured proofs are those that are organized into components in such a way 
that students can see how each component supports the main thrust of the proof. As 
Leron saw it, the memorable idea was the entire proof structure, not a step within the 
proof.  
Leron  and  Zaslavski  (2009)  discuss  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  generic 
proofs. One of the strengths of generic proofs is that they “enable students to engage 
with the main ideas of the complete proof in an intuitive and familiar context, tempo-
rarily suspending the formidable issues of full generality, formalism and symbolism” 
(p. 56). Generic proofs contain identifiable (and thus potentially memorisable) main 
ideas. The discussion in Hemmi (2008) is also closely related to pedagogical proper-
ties of proofs and to the way in which students encounter transparency and benefit 
from it.  
In her paper “Key ideas: What are they and how can they help us understand how 
people view proof?”, Raman (2003) characterizes people’s views of proof by bringing 
together two ideas about the production and evaluation of mathematical proof, making 
a distinction between an essentially public and an essentially private aspect of proof, 
and the notion of a key idea related to explanatory proofs. She concurs with Gowers 
that for mathematicians proof is essentially about key ideas.  
The vast research literature on proof and argumentation also contains many refer-
ences to the valuable properties of proof that Gowers sought to capture with his idea 
of width. See the extensive surveys by Mariotti (2006) and Durand-Guerrier, Boero, 
Douek, Epp, and Tanguay (2012); see also Pedemonte (2007). For example, Douek 
(2007) discusses the reference corpus that is used to back up an argument. This refer-
ence corpus might include visual arguments and experimental evidence, and might 
even depend on a given social context. Douek argues for non-linearity as a model of 
the mathematical thinking that takes place in the process of proving. This is where one 
sees a parallel between Douek’s view of argumentation and Gowers’ description of 
the quality of a proof, recalling that Gowers pointed out that proofs admit of artificial 
steps that look as if they spring from nowhere but turn out to be useful.  
Jahnke  (2009)  argues  that  it  is  possible  to  bridge  between  argumentation  and 
mathematical proof through explicit discussions of the role of mathematical proof in 
the empirical sciences, and by allowing students to bring in factual arguments. He 
says that “giving reasons in everyday situations means frequently to mention only the 
fact from which some event depends without an explicit deduction” (p. 141). 
Knipping (2008) speaks of a method for revealing structures of argumentation in 
the classroom and invokes the concepts of local and global arguments to analyze a 
proof,  believing  that  mathematical  logic  alone  cannot  capture  all  the  processes  of 
proving. Local arguments can certainly qualify as proof ideas in Gowers’s sense.   
In sum, Gowers’s focus on memorability as a desirable property of a mathemati-
cal proof, and his introduction of the concept of width, bring a new dimension to the 
teaching of proof. There remains a need to investigate the relationship between width G. Hanna  
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of a proof and memorability on the one hand, and on the other hand the many other 
important dimensions of proof and proving, such as mastery of mathematical concepts 
and techniques, grasp of proof structure, and knowledge of methods of proving. A 
deeper investigation of the concepts of width of a proof and memorability may lead to 
new ways of presenting and teaching proofs.  
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